Realism international relations essay

1713, where realism international relations essay was specifically mentioned. Europe obscured the balance of power. In the revolution’s aftermath, with the restoration of comparative calm, the principle once more emerged as the operative motive for the various political alliances, of which the ostensible object was the preservation of peace.

No one state has ever been strong enough to eat up all the rest, and the mutual jealousy of the Great Powers has preserved even the small states, which could not have preserved themselves. The balance of power may well land us all in crematory. Since 1945, the arguments of Streit and Earle has prevailed over that of Taylor. The balance-of-power system is discredited today. During the period of its dominance as a European system, say, 1648 to 1918, its record in preventing war was certainly not striking. Indeed, it probably was itself responsible for starting more wars than it prevented. 1648: “European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars and culminated in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945.

Europe and other democracies: “It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. Europe has a basic choice: either it lapses back into the old power politics and balance of power diplomacy of past centuries or it moves ahead along the road leading to a new order of peace and freedom, whether this be based on multinational or supranational cooperation. Our choice is clear: we are going forward. It was to be pacific, mediating, favourable to a balance which should prevent any power from having a hegemony on the continent or controlling the Channel coasts. Italian balance of power theory in England.

God has put into your hand the balance of power and justice, to poise and counterpoise at your will the actions and counsels of all the Christian kings of your time”. It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an imposture—it is an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing. The only point on which writers on the balance of power agree “is in the fundamental delusion that such a system was ever acceded to by the nations of Europe. They imply long, uninterrupted, peaceful and prosperous co-existence. England adopted the balance of power as “a corner-stone of English policy, unconsciously during the sixteenth, subconsciously during the seventeenth, and consciously during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because for England it represented the only plan of preserving her own independence, political and economic”. The size of the units which count effectively in international politics grows steadily larger.

There is no longer room in Europe today for those three or four important and strong countries whose more or less equal rivalries enabled Great Britain in the past to secure herself through the policy of the balance of power. Much nonsense has been talked in recent years about the balance of power. But the confusion of thought resulting from the attempt to brand it as a morally reprehensive policy has been less serious than the confusion resulting from the assumption that it is a policy which can be applied at all times and in all circumstances. British policy, based on a false premise, ended in disaster. Churchill is a man with an out-of-date political idea—that of the European balance of power.